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TOWARDS A FOREIGN POLICY OF MUTUALITY 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana 
(:o~ ~~L~/.1J~ Saturday, June 10, 1972, 10:00 a.m., M.D.T. 
I come here today to convey a word of optimism regarding 
the nation's foreign relations . Optimism in this connection is 
long overdue; still, I hope my reference to it at this time is 
not premature. Whatever the case, my expectation is that history 
may well record 1972 as the year in which a corner was turned 
for peace. There are indications that the world is headed back 
t owards constructive human purpose in its major internat i onal 
relationships. A water-shed appears to have been reached after a 
quarter century of dangerous dallying in the murky detours of the 
Cold War. 
Insofar as the government of th1s nation is concerned, 
except in the case of Indochina, I believe the President is 
responding in a new fashion to international circumstances. He 
is projecting not as adversary but as conciliator. In so doing , 
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he is paying heed to the legitimate claims of a public 
sentiment gr~wn impatient wi th the words of peace, sung to 
the cadence of war. 
So, I address a word of hope especia lly to you men and 
women of this graduating class. Your generation can take a great 
deal of credit f~r bringing about this change. Your manifest 
disenchantment with the foreign policies of the past and with 
the tragic travesty in the name of peace in Indochina has been 
impressed on Washington. You have underscored the point that 
government is itself governed, in the fina l analysis, by the 
depth and degree of public support which can be commanded for 
its policies . 
You have helped to inject balance into official channels 
and, hopefully, to assure that government will not soon again 
indulge in meaningless adventures abroad, largely at the expense 
of young life. If we are, in fact, going through the last Viet Nam, 
if we are, in fact, getting out at last, as I devoutly hope, you 
have done your share to that end . 
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To be sure, the millenium has not yet arrived . Doomsday 
missiles in the United States point at doomsday missiles several 
thousand miles and a few minutes away . We still have vast garr isons 
on the mainland of Southeast Asia. Planes are still engaged i n 
ra i ning terror out of the Indochina skies. Ships sow the 
i nstruments of destruction i n the waters south of China . Indeed, 
the Secretary of Defense has just told us that the spread of 
conflict, by sea and air, once again into North Vi et Nam--this 
latest episode in the cont inuing agony of the Indochina War, 
will cost the people of the nat ion an additional $5 billion 
this year, not to speak of more lives, more prisoners-of-war, 
and more missing i n action. 
Nor should we overlook , in any note of optimism, the 
social and economic overload wh ich a r is es at home from these and 
other wasting demands abroad; the capacities of the nat ion are 
great but they a re not unlimited. The stra i n of serving, for a 
quarter- of-a- century as the wor ld's leading policeman, banker, 
pioneer i n space and what-not shows in the prices that are paid 
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ln every store in the nation. It shows, too, 'n the neglect 
of the env·ronment, in the decay of cities and i n the r ise of 
crime, drug addiction and other barometers of social breakdown 
within our society. 
Before we can speak of any real light at the end of the 
tunnel, we must face up to the immediate problems of the trans i tion 
from the exertions of war to the work of peace. That the 
adjustments can be difficult and pa i nful has been brought home t o 
us by the President's announcement that the ABM site at Ma l mstrom 
wi ll become i noperative under the terms of the Nixon-Brezhnev 
treaty. In th i s case, as in many others, we must find--the 
federal government has an obligation to ass i st i n f i nding--
constructive alternatives . 
These qualifications aside, however, the fact is that the 
world has come a long distance towards sanity and order in the 
short space of a few months . That is why, in my judgment, the 
class of 1972 can look with some confidence t o the future. 
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There is a chance that the evil genies which have plagued us for 
a quarter century can be put back securely in the bottle. 
Consider what has been achieved by the diplomacy of the 
past year. What comes to mind most vividly, of course, is the 
President's just completed journey to Moscow . The accords 
which were c0ncluded there were highly significant i n themselves. 
Yet, the most important result of the Moscow summit may be found 
not tn specific achievements. Rather, it may emerge from the 
changes of national a tt1tude on both sides which were reflected 
in the meetings. 
The results of the Nix0n-Brezhnev talks indicated a clear 
acceptance of mutual self-interest as the basis f or the future 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
We have not always been very prompt in the past to recognize 
nat·onal self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace. To be 
sure, we have sometimes over-assumed a national interest, as in 
Vtet Nam and on that basis, spent the lives of tens of thousands 
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of Amer i cans and permitted over $13~ bill ·on dollars t o be suc ked 
up by the destructive sponge o f that confl .ct. Now, after years 
o f this deadly wastage we have at last discovered that our on l y 
valid national concern is to get back the prisoners o f war and 
the recoverable missing in action. We have come at last to 
realize that our only national interest is to get out of the 
Indochina involvement, lock, stock and barrel. 
If on s0me occas i ons we have over- assumed nat j onal i nterests, 
on others, we have ignored them almost as though they were not 
f i tt i ng to a great power. So, we have hes i t ated to define our 
bona f i de concerns and pursued, instead, the will o'the wisp of 
ideological conflict . We have done so on the basis of such 
slogans as "Make the World Safe for Democracy," and most recently 
the "Battle for the Minds of Men" or the "Containment of Communism." 
The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any victories. 
Rather, it has projected us into a hodge-podge of foreign aid, 
military alliances and into overseas pro paganda and other dub ious 
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m·tnlpulntlvc oper·lt,lonn . The wnrm humAn concern or Amerlcnnt: 
for o ther peoplen has been distorted by ideological warfnre nnd 
we hnve plunged, w ttv>ut wurr·tnt, intn the internal pnlltlcnl 
and coclal affairs or other nntlnns ev<'rywhere In the world. 
For two decades this costly exercise has become A way of 1 lfe ror 
hundreds of thousAnds of Americans, some c>f whom hove scarcely 
set foot In the United Stntes for many years. If there Is a new 
Jlght of hope, It Is In large part because this random flnlltng 
appears to be coming to A.n end. In plnce of the cacophony or the 
Cold War, the recent Moscow conference Sp)ke softly of "Basic 
Principles of Mutual Relntlons between the Un lted StAtes and the 
U. S.S.R. 11 In these prlnclplf's , the twfl nations recognized that 
there Is no feasible answer In a nuclear age to the prospect of 
mutual annlhilntlon other than mutual collaboration . 
The two powers have begun, now, to move toward what President 
Nixon has called n position of 11 mutually agreed restralnt 11 In 
armAments . To that end, n treaty has been ne~otiated by President 
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N:xon t~ limit o ffens've and defens i ve s trateg ic nuclear we~pons 
on both sides . As I have already indi cated, th i s treaty ha s a 
special meaning for Montana because it j s expected that Ma l mstrom 
will not be developed now as Rn ABM s i te . In the ci rcumstances, 
what I told the Senate in opposing the ABM program three years 
ago bears repeating today. On April 1, 1969, I said: "If this 
proposed ABM missile system . . . is right for the nat ion, it wi l1 
be right for Montana. If it is wrong for the nat·on, however, the 
location of one s i te at Malmstrom cannot make i t rtght. 
"What economic benefit to a Montana community will equal 
the additional tax burdens and the new inflatjon which will 
weigh on all the people of Montana ... ? If the system becomes an 
insatiable maw for the consumption of public resources, who wjll 
pay for the neglect of other urgent needs , if not all the people 
of the nation including Montanans? 11 
That was my position on the ABM three years ago . It remains 
my position . I will support the President in regard to the 
Nixon- Br ezhnev Treaty . 
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The diplomacy by which the treaty was negotiated is similar 
to that which led the Pres i dent to take the first steps i n 
breaking down the barriers of isolation and separation wi th the 
People's Republ i c of Ch i na. To digress for a moment for a personal 
note, let me say that on March 29, 1968, I gave the f i rst lecture 
sponsored by the Mike and Maureen Mansfie l d Foundat ion at the 
University . The subject was "Chi na: Retrospect and Prospect." 
My remarks, four years ago, contained th i s statement : 
"It ought to be made unequi vocal that we are 
prepared at all t i mes to meet with Ch i nese 
representatives-- formally or informally-- in 
order to consider d j fferences between Chi na 
and the Unjted States over Viet Nam or any other 
question of common concern. " 
The President's visit to Peki ng early this year which 
was followed by the journey of the Senate Minority Leader and 
myself a few weeks ago, has now made unequivocal the read i ness 
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of this nat on to meet wi th China to the end that difficulties 
may be diss~lved and civil contact restored between the t wo 
peooles. Four years is a long time. It is a long delay--but 
it is a beginning. The Great Wall of separation has c~mmenced 
to crumble and the way to a stable peace i n As i a is ~pening at last. 
What the President has done with regard to the Chinese 
Pe ~ple's Republic is to remove a self- i mposed straight-jacket 
on the foreign policies of the nation . Following World War II, 
for example, rather than face the great upheava l which had taken 
place i n China, we chose not to recogn i ze but to quarantine it . 
We cut oursel ves off fr~m contact wi th these monumenta l changes, 
thinking a ll the while that by so do i ng we somehow could exerc i se 
polit i cal control over them . In retrospect, it is clear that we 
had little or no effect over the course of events . 
The fact is that there was a v i ab l e and i ndependent 
government in control in Chi na for many years before we chose 
to acknowledge that such was the case . It availed us nothing 
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to ignore and isolate ourselves from that government. Yet, we 
continued to do so long after this policy had lost the last 
shred of a rationale. 
Now that myths have begun to be replaced by realities, 
we can proceed to explore with the People's Republic of China, 
as the President has started to do wi th the Soviet Union, the 
possibilities of mutual accommodation . The change comes very late . 
Already, as I have indicated, the economy of the nat ion reveals 
the stresses imposed by unrealistic and excessively costly 
foreign-defense policies . Last year, for example , it was necessary 
to devalue the dollar, to raise import duties and to impose 
domestic controls to prevent a catastr ophic breakdown in the 
nation's financial grid. The process of adjustment had been 
delayed too long to make a graceful and painless trans ition and 
it will be prudent to anticipate still other shocks i n the future. 
Neverthel ess, we are now moving in the di rection of 
mutuality, of a sharing of responsibi lit i es and leadership wi th 
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other nations . In part, this process depends on negotiat:ons. 
In part, however, it is possjble to ta ke unilateral actions . 
It is not always necessary to await the pleasure of others in 
order t o lighten our self- imposed burdens . I have, for example, 
not hesitated to urge un ilateral action at various times w;th 
regard to Vi et Nam in an effort to bring the involvement to a 
more rapid conclus ion. I have done so because the ending of thi s 
mistaken adventure is our problem and our problem alone. Every 
day that the involvement persists adds to the burdens of the 
people of th i s nation, to the list of dead and wounded and to the 
devastation of the hapless people of Indochina. Others may have 
an interest in our withdrawal from this conflict. But none has 
a more vital interest than this nation in getting out wi thout delay . 
I have also urged unilateral action to bring about a 
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Europe. There is no 
rhyme or reason, i n my judgment, to keep more than half-million 
U. S. military personnel and dependents in Western Europe a quarter 
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of a century after World War II at the expense of the people 
of the United States. Whatever purposes of foreign policy the 
U. S. garrison in Europe may still serve, the same purposes can 
be met by a far smaller contingent . As it is now, this enormous 
deployment is a drain on U. S. revenues; it is fuel for i nflation 
in the United States and it is a major source of the weakness of 
the dollar in relation to the currencies of other nat ions . 
I have stressed this issue time and again against the 
resistance of the Executive Branch under the Administrat ions of 
three Presidents . Insofar as I am concerned , it will continue 
to be stressed, notwithstanding the Moscow agreements which call 
for negotiation of mutual and balanced r eductions of forces in 
Europe . The fact i s that the Soviet Union does not pay for this 
antiquated and lar gely i rrelevant U. S. deployment . The Europeans 
do not pay for it . The people of this nat ion pay the cost in 
their taxes. I s ee no particular virtue in prolonged negotiations 
with the Russ ians to bring about a reduction of U. S . for ces which 
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should have been done years ago in our own interest . I am 
appalled to think of the billions which have already been 
wasted in this long waiting game. 
There was a time within the clear remembrance of many of 
us here today, when the rhetoric of Cold War was part and parcel 
of policy . That was a time when there did not appear to be any 
mutuality of interests between East and West and when it would 
have been futile to urge unilateral steps to reduce tensions. 
Those were the days when each nation was what George Washington 
so correctly described as the 11 slave of its own animosity." 
The essential fact in precipitating the Cold War was that 
two powerful new for ces-- ideology and technology--came together at 
the close of World War II . Th i s fusion vastly complicated the 
whole interplay of international affairs. The technological 
problem was awesome in its simplicity. With the great flood of 
scientific and engineering advances, governments came into 
possession of the power of instant and worldwide destruct ion. 
In consequence, the processes of statecraft were compressed in 
time and altered radically in conduct . 
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In this country there was a Constitutional fall-out from 
these technological developments. The power of the Executive 
Branch in foreign affairs increased drastically even as the 
power of legislatures shrank in proportion. In crises, so it 
was reasoned, there would not be time to make political decisions, 
much less debate the issues. At the same time, the new technology 
of war, by its scope and complexity, became more than ever a 
partner of government, with a vested interest in its own perpetuity 
and a high potential for distorting public decisions about war 
and peace. 
The other aspect of the Cold War--the ideological problem--
arose from the fact that two of the victors in World War li-- the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--were revolut ionary 
states committed to a system of social and economic organization 
which was anathema to this nation. The conspiratorial aspect of 
Communism posed a particularly painful problem for the United 
States, breeding suspicion, distrust and division in government. 
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It became d i fficult to separate valid threats to nat·ona l 
security from the bombast of the power-seekers . Enlightened 
public debate became constrained and as a result public policy 
was not always subjected as fully as it should have been to the 
purgative of critical challenge . So the political paroxysms 
of the '50's led to the rigid policies of the •6o•s. 
History may well record that we pursued the correct foreign 
policies into the early 1960's; that we bought time, through 
containment and counterforce, to permit the gradual moderation 
of Communist power, thereby reducing the Marxist states to the 
political dimensions of other nations . However that may be, it 
has been apparent for some time that we persisted in these policies 
too long. We were blind to changes elsewhere and to the possibili-
ties of adjusting to mutual interest. In the end, we came to 
the disaster of Viet Nam . It is part of the price which has been 
exacted for the obstinate pursuit of the obsolete in foreign 
policy . 
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How can it be prevented from happening again? Quite 
poss i bly the world will not soon see a repetition of the 
particular confluence of historical forces--ideology and 
technology--which produced the rigidities of the Cold War. 
Poss i bl y, the awareness of our own electorate may now be such 
that prolonged periods of national self- delusion will no longer 
be countenanced. Perhaps, more effective techniques will be 
found in the art of government which wi ll act to limber the dead 
weight of massive bureaucracy and so bring about a greater 
responsiveness to changing circumstances both at home and 
abroad. Perhaps, the addition of the under-21-voters to the 
electorate will revitalize the entire political process. In 
any event, it is doubtful that your generation--seared as it 
has been by the folly and outrage of Viet Nam- - will long 
suffer in silence a foreign policy which is based on the 
outdated. 
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In the final analysis it comes down to the degree 
to which an enlightened and vigorous electorate will probe 
and test and call to account the policies of its own government. 
President Brewster of Ya le has put it in these words: 
"Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are often 
painful, even agonizing; their price is nothing, 
however, compared to the resentment aroused by a 
feeling of manipulated ignorance. 11 
Your generation has some reason to feel, I'm sure, that 
it has paid the high price of ''manipulated ignorance ." At least 
you have the advantage of knowing clearly what your generation 
must avoid. I am confident that you can and will not only skirt 
the pitfalls of the past , but being thus spared the old burdens, 
you will be free to explore the vast possibilities of mutual 
accommodation with all peoples in a world which is now beginning 
to be liberated from its obsolete fears. 
You can do no more. You should do no less. 
